A lesson yet to emerge from the Chilcot Inquiry is the impact that our invasion of Iraq had on Afghanistan. A complaint I have repeated in this column has been that there was a lack of focus on Afghanistan.
I know that hindsight is the most exact science, but the destruction of the Taliban regime, instead of leading to swift reconstruction, led to years of drift and loss of the initiative, followed by a growing insurgency where none previously existed.
We have been there 8 years and what may now be achievable is rather less than what might have been achievable had it been our main effort from the outset, instead of being side-tracked to Iraq.
The aim is now to build up the Afghan army so that we can increasingly step back. This is a sensible policy but it will be impossible to recapture the early levels of public support and goodwill .There is a commonly accepted illusion that the Taliban is a clearly defined ideologically driven entity served by fanatics.
This is true only in part. Mainly, it is an insurgency driven by any number of local grievances, tribal and clan rivalries, criminal undertakings, along with the desire to be rid of foreign troops. A strong Afghan army will undoubtedly help, but beware, this army is largely made up of the Tajik ethnic minority, where the insurgency is mainly confined to the Pashtun tribal areas. I hope this has been thoroughly thought through.
I have just played a very small part in a major training exercise for British forces about to deploy to Afghanistan: we have the most professional, well trained and dedicated armed services. They deserve our admiration and support. It is vital, however, that the objectives that we have set them at the political level have been rigorously scrutinised so that they are realistic and achievable with the forces at our disposal. |
