The row over the announcement that the recently retired Chief of The General Staff is to take the Tory whip in the House of Lords, and will be a defence minister in a future Conservative government, has not only raised questions of constitutional propriety but has sharpened differences over the conduct of the war in Afghanistan.
For my part, I welcome David Cameron's appointment of the general. Generals do usually ask for more men and equipment. It is politicians, however, who are accountable to the voters for the consequences and costs of deploying those reinforcements and, therefore, they have every right to deny the requests of the generals. They must, nevertheless, have good reason for doing so, and a proper analysis to justify the decision that are making in the face of contradictory advice from the General Staff.
General Dannat has indeed been asking for more troops than ministers have been prepared to authorise for some time. Have ministers refused these requests on the basis that they know better than the generals, or are they just paralysed by dither and indecision? I suspect it is the latter. Our involvement in Afghanistan has been characterised from the very start by indecision and quite unrealistic expectations, the principal example being the hope expressed by the then secretary of state John Reid that we might complete the mission in Helmand 'without firing a single shot'. Subsequently, the politicians have muddled through rather than getting a grip on the situation. We have been waging this war longer than the Second World War lasted and we have seen a succession of secretaries of state come and go. The current incumbent is the second most junior member of the Cabinet. This is no way to conduct a campaign: we need a proper war cabinet and having a general in it is likely to be an enormous asset by bringing an informed military analysis to the table.
Consider this Military analysis:
"….Of these causes, one affected all our efforts and contributed much to turning our defeat into disaster – the failure to give the forces in the field a clear strategic object for the campaign. As a result, our plans had to be based on the rather nebulous, short-term idea of holding ground –we were not even sure what ground or for what purpose."
Nothing could speak more eloquently of the confusion over our objectives in Afghanistan: what exactly is our strategic objective?
Is it to secure democracy; improve the conditions of the Afghans and provide hitherto unavailable educational opportunities for girls; to eradicate the poppy crop and heroin trade; or is it just to destroy the Taliban?
Clarity on this really matters because it will determine whether the mission can actually be achieved with the available resources; it will determine what ground should be taken and held, and why.
Although I believe it speaks volumes about Afghanistan my quotation is actually from General Slim's account of the 14th Army's Burma Campaign Defeat into Victory -which is still required reading for all officers at Sandhurst. Slim's conclusion was that lack of strategic direction was the principal cause of the initial loss of Burma.
At Sandhurst officers are taught that the first principle of war is 'selection and maintenance of the Aim': a nation going to war and putting its young men and women in the line of fire must be given a clearly understood purpose. The fact that so few of us appear to understand precisely what we are doing in Afghanistan is a measure of how the Government has failed to define the Aim. Once defined, maintaining the Aim requires a single minded focus excluding all distractions and here Government's record was lamentable, not only has there been a rapid turn over of defence ministers, but one of them was even a part timer-doubling up as Secretary of state for Scotland.
I believe that it is this lack of focus and single mindedness has been largely responsible for the planning failures which have resulted in our forces being exposed to greater danger because of a lack of sufficiently armoured vehicles and helicopters.
Ceneral Sir Richard Dannatt has been voicing his proper concern throughout his stewardship as Chief of The General Staff. It earned him the opprobrium of ministers and a whispering campaign against him (that this included raising questions about his expenses is just grotesque given the venality of politicians themselves).
I believe that the war in Afghanistan is too important to lose. To do so would be a huge boost to the terrorists and make the world a more dangerous place by restoring the havens for terrorist training. It would seriously destabilise Pakistan which is potentially a much greater problem. If we can stop the rot by bringing military clarity into the cabinet by appointing General Dannat to the next government, then so much the better. |
