The Prospect of Reform of the House of Lords has been raised once again as a ‘first-term’ objective for an incoming Labour Government.
I rather doubt it, any new government usually finds that it has much more pressing priorities for the legislative time available to it.
Nobody would have sat down and designed the House of Lords as it now is, but it works effectively as the revising chamber for legislation that the Commons simply hasn’t given enough time over to scrutinising thoroughly.
The first Lord’s reform of 1911, when they conceded power over finance and were restricted largely to delaying powers when in disagreement with the Commons, was designed to be temporary. The expectation was that an elected House would replace it within a decade or so. Of course, it never happened.
When, in 1998, the Blair Government culled the hereditary element, they allowed 100 hereditaries to remain temporarily -elected by the hereditary peers themselves. This arrangement was to only supposed to endure until a through reform would subsequently replace them with elected peers. They are still there, and every time one of them dies, a byelection is held amongst the hereditary peers to elect another to serve instead. The irony is that the remaining hereditaries are the only peers with any democratic legitimacy, because at least they were elected by someone.
In 2011 the Coalition Government, under pressure from the Liberal Democrats, invested precious parliamentary time in an attempt to legislate for elections to the House of Lords. It all came to nothing because the Commons could not agree on any particular scheme by which it would be achieved. My estimate is that exactly same outcome would be repeated were a government to attempt it again.
There are two fundamental reasons why the Commons will find reasons to prevent the Lords being elected. First, no MP wants a peer on their patch purporting to also represent their constituents too.
Second, we are savvy enough to realise that were the Lords to be elected and so legitimately claim to represent the people, they would no longer be content to be a mere revising chamber and without financial control: So, there would be enormous pressure on the Commons to share real political power.
There is reason why ordinary voters too should beware of democratic Lords reform: the huge bill that would come with it and which would be another claim on our taxes.
Were the Lords to become elected tribunes of the people, they would no longer be content with expenses and a per diem allowance, they’d want salaries and pensions just like MPs. They would demand staff too. They’d need offices to operate from and to accommodate their staff. This extension to the secure parliamentary estate would present a huge new capital cost, in addition to all the extra running costs.
And all for what?
To elect more politicians when we already have quite enough.